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EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INCIDENCE OF ACCIDENTS IN THE 
WORKPLACE ON FIRMS’ FINANCIAL PERFORMANCE 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The academic attention given to accidents in the workplace has been matched by 
that examining their economic impact. Some authors report the negative economic 
consequences of workplace injuries for individual workers (e.g. Reville and Schoeni, 2001; 
Breslin et al., 2007; Woock, 2009; Crichton et al., 2011), while others report the negative 
consequences for the economy as a whole. Thus, Weil (2001), for example, undertakes a 
review of previous studies examining the economic consequences of work injury and 
illness. In the main, the studies he reviews focus on the economy as a whole and consider 
expenditures on medical costs and loss of earnings in the households of injured workers, 
finding significant divergences between theoretical and actual valuations. More recent 
studies have adopted a similar approach (e.g. Corso et al., 2006; Lim et al., 2011). Barth et 
al. (2007) report that a rising gross domestic product rate is associated with a decline in 
occupational injuries. Mainardi (2005) analyzed earnings differentials in the mining 
industry across various countries, and accounts for them in relation to different variables, 
including the occurrence of severe accidents. Adnett and Dawson (1998) point out that the 
conventional approach to the economic analyses of industrial accidents relies upon a simple 
compensating wage premium. In a similar vein, Martinello and Meng (1992) and 
Gunderson and Hyatt (2001) report the existence of a wage premium associated with 
workplace risks. 
However, very few studies examine the economic consequences of accidents in the 
workplace for firms; moreover, the empirical findings of those that do provide uncertain 
conclusions. Kaminski (2001) analyzed the impact of new organizational practices on 
productivity and injury rates, but finds no clear relations between a firm’s performance and 
its safety objectives. For instance, and somewhat surprisingly, more hours worked was 
associated with a lower injury rate and lower productivity, while performance-based pay 
induced higher injury rates and lower productivity. By contrast, the number of training 
hours was negatively related to the injury rate and positively related to one specific measure 
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of productivity. Similarly, Saurin et al. (2004) find contradictory evidence when examining 
the integration of production and safety plans in two industrial building projects in Brazil. 
Taking a qualitative approach, Smallman and John (2001) conducted in-depth interviews 
with eight business leaders of FTSE 500 organizations. On the basis of these responses, 
they report that poor occupational health safety performance would appear to lead to 
competitive disadvantage, but they offer no quantitative evidence to support this. 
According to the business leaders, this competitive disadvantage is the result of the 
impairment of a firm’s status in the eyes of one or more of its stakeholders. The authors 
report that the companies have little idea of their on-going outlay on safety-related items or 
of the financial return on their investment in safety.  
Elsewhere, Kjellén et al. (1997) analyzed a Norwegian aluminum plant that 
implemented a quality control system and a safety, health and environment management 
system over a ten-year period. They report a reduction in the plant’s operation 
expenditures, in parallel with an improvement in quality control, safety, health and 
environment indicators, but the authors do not perform any statistical tests. Moreover, the 
study only includes one manufacturing plant, which impedes the drawing of any statistical 
inferences. Fernández-Muñiz et al. (2009, 2012) report a significant positive relation 
between safety management and firm performance, but their studies have several 
limitations. As their findings are based on the responses to a questionnaire conducted with 
the firms’ safety officers, the ultimate sample reflects the willingness of these officers to 
take part, a fact that could originate biases, with the firms with the best safety culture (and 
presumably the lowest accident rates) being more predisposed to participate. Similarly, the 
authors measured the firms’ safety management systems in the light of participant 
responses, but presented no data for the firms’ actual accident rates. Moreover, while the 
authors test the incidence of safety climate and safety management on company 
performance and competitiveness, they do not examine the incidence of accidents in the 
workplace on financial performance. In addition, as the authors themselves stress, they do 
not conduct a time-series data analysis in these studies. 
Multiple circumstances influence the incidence of occupational accidents, and many 
factors have been proposed as contributing to such hazards (e.g. Cheng et al., 2010). While 
the most important factors influencing accident rates would appear to be economic 
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(Wooden, 1989), they are typically ignored in most analyses. The provision of new data on 
the interaction between accident rates and firms’ financial performance at the 
microeconomic level should provide important information to prevent accidents in the 
workplace. Indeed, a precondition established by firms for promoting safety is that the 
economic benefits of such measures should be visible and quantifiable. Yet, the costs and 
losses attributable to unsafe work are usually not visible in a firm’s accounting, and the 
potential gains of promoting safety are uncertain. As such, safety is likely to be sacrificed 
when management makes a trade-off between the costs and benefits of workplace safety. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no single study has analyzed the incidence of 
occupational accidents on firm performance. Here, therefore, we seek to contribute to the 
literature by undertaking an empirical study of this relationship. While we find no 
significant influence of accident rates on the short-term financial performance of Spanish 
firms, we do find a significant negative influence of accidents in the workplace on one-
year-ahead financial performance. Occupational accidents are unexpected events that entail 
a disruption to a firm’s daily operations and which ultimately detract from strategic, value-
adding activities and long-term financial performance. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: the next section outlines the 
methodology employed, section 3 presents our main findings and section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology 
 
2.1. Hypothesis development 
 
Rechenthin (2004) claims that safety can provide a sustainable competitive 
advantage, since it has an impact on morale, profitability, turnover, and productivity, and 
reflects a well-run operation. Zacharatos et al. (2005) argue that sound human resource 
practices that encourage participative decision-making, the sharing of information and 
high-quality training are significantly associated with occupational safety. Therefore, if we 
assume that such human resource practices ensure firms obtain greater productivity, a 
plausible link should exist between safety and firm performance. Thus, safety would be the 
outcome of a sound human resources policy entailing a participative and motivating setting, 
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which in the end would boost a firm’s profitability. The contrary would be the case for a 
lack of safety: accidents in the workplace undermine workers’ motivation and participation, 
and threaten well-run operations and firm performance. Accidents interrupt the production 
process, generating financial and opportunity costs, disrupt production quantity and quality, 
and diminish a firm’s productivity. Accidents can also cause firms to miss delivery dates 
and suffer delays that lead to economic losses and a deterioration in customer perceptions 
of the firm, etc. As far as the workers are concerned, unsafe conditions can undermine their 
motivation and productivity, with the result that skilled workers choose to leave the firm. 
When an accident occurs in the workplace, many additional, uncalculated, yet potentially 
substantial, costs are incurred (Harshbarger, 2001). Work accidents are unplanned and 
unwanted events that result in a whole series of undesirable events: damage to property, 
unscheduled halts in production, a loss of workers’ skills, etc. In contrast, the careful 
introduction of safety measures should lower the number of accidents in the workplace, and 
contribute to a reduction in the costs and losses associated with these unwanted events. 
Weber and Weber (2004) report that reductions in inefficiency in the US trucking industry 
not only enhance real income, but also reduce traffic fatalities. This empirical evidence 
points to the existence of what would appear to be a highly plausible positive effect of a 
reduction in a firm’s accident rate on profitability. 
 
We can thus formulate the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1.  Accidents in the workplace have a negative influence on firm performance. 
Corcoran (2002) suggests that the true economic incidence of work accidents is not 
in fact realized until the future, because when an accident occurs employees must refocus 
their efforts to deal with the incident while simultaneously ensuring that production 
continues. All employees involved have to set aside the work they are then engaged in so as 
to deal with the unanticipated event. Often daily operations and production suffer very little 
as it is strategic and planning activities that are typically postponed in order to ensure 
operations are maintained. Thus, for instance, a supervisor might step in to run a machine, 
or a quality meeting might be postponed to complete the production run. Indeed, the time of 
supervisors and managers is typically spent on bureaucratic procedures, such as seeking to 
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replace the injured employee, undertaking an accident investigation, and generally dealing 
with the paperwork generated by the problem, etc. In practice, therefore, it is strategic 
tasks, including those related to quality assurance, product development, process 
improvement, recruitment and upgrading the resource planning system, that are set aside. In 
short, efforts are redirected from value-added to operational activities and so a company’s 
losses are incurred primarily in the area of competitive advantage. Thus, the incidence of 
accidents in the workplace does not show up immediately in the profit and loss statement, 
but becomes apparent in the future.  
There is a widely held perception among managers of the importance of strategic 
planning and the need to devote sufficient time to it (e.g. Trachtman, 2012, Bradford, 
2012); this concern is also expressed by academics. Despite some debate concerning the 
degree to which business planning should be formalized (Titus et al., 2011) and its actual 
impact on certain performance items such as new product development (e.g. Song et al., 
2011), there is broad body of empirical evidence highlighting the beneficial effects of such 
planning. For instance, Delmar and Shane (2003) found that business planning enhances 
product development and new ventures. Brinckmann et al. (2010) performed a meta-
analysis of 46 studies finding overall evidence that business planning increases firm 
performance, and that it is generally a value-creating activity. More specifically, Kim and 
Sung-Choon (2013) report empirical evidence that strategic human resource management 
improves firm performance. Thus, despite some doubts concerning the extent to which 
strategic planning should be formalized, it seems beyond question that such planning 
increases performance. 
Given the fact that work accidents disrupt a firm’s activities, distracting attention 
away from value-adding activities, and considering the extant empirical evidence for the 
beneficial effects of business planning on firm performance, we formulate the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. The true incidence of accidents in the workplace on firm performance tends 
to be in the long- rather than in the short-run. 
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2.2. Empirical design 
 
Starting with the parsimonious models widely used in business studies for 
estimating and/or predicting firm performance (e.g. Carnes et al., 2003, Kim and Kross, 
2005, Dechow et al., 1998, Argilés et al., 2011), we assume that a firm’s profitability 
depends on its profitability in a previous period. Past profitability captures an array of firm 
and management characteristics that have to be taken into consideration when explaining 
future firm performance. Cheng (2005a) used a basic model for predicting future 
profitability where the dependent variable is profitability in year t+1 and the independent 
variable is profitability in year t, and found significant positive coefficients in all 
estimations performed. This basic model has been used efficiently in other studies (e.g. 
Bandyopadhyay et al., 2010). Profitability in a given year depends not only on past 
profitability, but also on recent management decisions, which elicit changes in firm 
efficiency, as well as on industry specific circumstances. Thus, we test the incidence of 
accidents in the workplace on firm profitability by applying the following model: 
 
, = 	 +  ∙ , +  ∙ , +  ∙ ,
+   ∙ ,


+ , 																																																					(1) 
 
where each observation refers to firm i in a given year t, ROA is return on assets, ACRATE 
is accident rate, CHASSETURN is the change in efficiency experienced by the firm during 
the year, and SECTOR are dummy variables controlling for industry characteristics. Given 
that our purpose is to test our hypotheses on the incidence of accident rate in a given year to 
firm profitability in the same year and to profitability in the following year, τ may be either 
t or t-1. 
We use ROA as a measure of firm profitability. It is widely used in business and academic 
research as the main indicator of firm financial performance (e.g. Tan and Wang, 2010, Al-
Tuwaijri et al., 2004), especially in non-listed firms. It is the ratio of income before 
leverage to total assets in percent, indicating firm profitability before leverage relative to its 
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size. We expect to find a positive relationship with firm profitability in the previous and the 
current year. 
While firm profitability in a given period depends on previous profitability, it also 
depends on organizational features prevailing in the same period. Management decisions 
can introduce certain changes in firm efficiency. Here, we approach this efficiency via asset 
turnover: the ratio of firm sales to total assets. It is a measure of firm efficiency commonly 
used in business by practitioners and academics (e.g. Fairfield and Yohn, 2001, Singh and 
Davidson III, 2003). It indicates how efficiently a firm uses its assets in generating sales to 
the company. More precisely, the variable used in our model (CHASSETURN) is the 
change in efficiency experienced by the firm during the period: the difference between its 
asset turnover in a given year and in the previous year, relative to asset turnover in the 
previous year. This variable summarizes the effects of current management decisions in a 
given period. An improvement in firm efficiency results in an increase in firm profitability, 
and vice versa; thus, we expect a positive sign for this variable. 
Economic theory suggests that firm performance is influenced by specific industry 
patterns. For instance, barriers to entry, industry concentration and cyclical effects are 
important determinants of firm profitability. Dechow et al. (1999) and Cheng (2005a, 
2005b) found that industry characteristics help to predict future earnings. We use the 
dummy variables SECTOR, indicating, with a value of 1, that the firm belongs to a given 
sector, and 0 otherwise.  
Our variable of interest is the accident rate (ACRATE): the percent of workers 
injured with respect to the firm’s total workforce in a given year. In order to test our 
hypotheses we perform estimations relating the accident rate in a given year to firm 
profitability in the same year and to profitability in the following year. 
While the above model tests the incidence of accidents on firm profitability we also 
build an additional model to analyze their incidence on abnormal firm profitability. We 
argue that labor accidents are unexpected events that interrupt a firm’s daily operations and, 
as such, they can have an unexpected impact on firm profitability. We analyze the 
incidence of the work accident rate on unexpected changes in firm profitability controlling 
for industry characteristics and firm size. We then formulate the following model: 
 
9 
 
", = #	 + # ∙ , + #$ ∙ %, +	 # ∙ ,


+ , 																																																																																																			(2) 
 
where ABNROA is abnormal firm profitability, meaning unexpected changes in firm 
profitability. We consider firm size in terms of the value of their assets held at the 
beginning of the accounting period. We then use the Spanish consumer price index to 
deflate this value to correspond to that of the first year for which we have data. Size 
presents a non-normal distribution, as there are usually a comparatively large number of 
small firms competing with just a few big firms. Therefore, we use the natural logarithm of 
assets (LNASSET) as the independent variable in the model. It is usually used as 
independent variable controlling for size in empirical research in business (e.g. Tan and 
Wang, 2010, Klein, 2002). Large firms can exploit scale economies, favorable credit 
market conditions and better management and planning activities, while small firms’ 
advantages are dependent on their flexibility, allowing them to respond to changing 
circumstances or specific requirements (You, 1995). Small firms are thus better able to 
cater to customers’ needs, to respond to changing consumer tastes and to satisfy specific 
market niches (Piore and Sabel, 1984; Salais and Storper, 1992). Such firms also have a 
“thinner” organization, which facilitates a lower span of control and ensures a quicker 
response time and decision-making process (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Knight and 
Cavusgil, 1996). In this regard, Bonaccorsi (1992) and Jolly et al. (1992) specifically report 
evidence of the earlier and quicker internationalization of small, technology-intensive 
firms. Big firms tend to manage their activity through more carefully planned and stable 
patterns than is the case of small firms. The former are less able to supply unexpected 
increases in market demand; yet, they are less flexible to adjust their resources and to avoid 
costs when activity unexpectedly falls. Therefore, we expect a negative incidence of size on 
abnormal firm performance. 
Likewise, we assume that there are specific industry facts and characteristics that 
can influence the occurrence of unexpected profitability. For instance, the building industry 
is highly volatile and accounted for unexpectedly high profit levels in Spain during the 
period studied. 
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As in equation (1), our variable of interest is the accident rate (ACRATE), and we 
perform estimations relating the accident rate for a given year to abnormal firm profitability 
in the same year and to abnormal profitability in the following year. 
In order to calculate the abnormal firm profitability, we first estimate a model to 
forecast the expected return on assets. We start from the basic model proposed by Cheng 
(2005a) and formulate the following equation to estimate the firm’s predicted profitability: 
 
, = '	 + ' ∙ , + '( ∙ , + , 																												(3) 
 
where firm profitability depends on previous profitability and current changes in efficiency. 
As in Equation (1), current firm profitability depends on past and current management 
decisions. The former are summarized in last year’s profitability, while the relative changes 
in asset turnover, with respect to the previous year, capture new facts, decisions and 
technical and organizational changes applied within the firm. 
We then post-estimate the firm’s predicted profitability (PREDROA) and calculate 
the abnormal firm profitability as follows: 
 
", = , − +,, 																																															(4) 
 
 
 
2.3. Sample and data 
 
Our study requires data on accidents in the workplace from individual firms, but 
such information is not available in any published form. We therefore contacted the Labor 
Department of the Catalan Government who provided us with data on accidents that had 
occurred in firms operating in Catalonia. In a first instance we selected the wider available 
periods of data where labor accidents would not be influenced by Government regulations. 
The last main Spanish regulations of labor accidents were issued in November 1995, 
December 2003 and October 2006. We refused data from 2008 on, because the financial 
crisis entailed a harsh economic downturn in Spain, especially in the building industry, with 
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its subsequent decrease in accidents in the workplace, as well as in firm income. The 
Catalan Government provided us with data on labor accidents of the three industries with 
the highest accident rates in Catalonia (and in Spain for that matter) between 1998 and 
2003, where results are not likely distorted by changes in regulations and/or by the recent 
economic downturn. The building (Spanish activity code number 45), retail & household 
repairs (code number 52) and metallurgical manufacturing -except machinery- (code 
number 28) industries reported the highest number of accidents in the workplace in 
Catalonia (with 21.04, 6.81 and 6.06% of all occupational injuries respectively in 2013). 
We then selected 100 firms operating in each of the three industries according to the 
following criteria: in the first instance, we included all firms reporting fatal accidents; then 
firms reporting serious accidents; and, finally, the sample was completed with firms 
reporting minor accidents.  
Financial data for these firms were obtained from the Spanish SABI data base, 
which contains financial statements and other basic details for around a million Spanish 
firms. Note that as these financial statements refer to the assets and activities of firms 
operating throughout the whole of the Spanish state and our data on accidents in the 
workplace refer solely to Catalonia, the firms included in the eventual sample had to satisfy 
the following requirements: the firm’s headquarters and at least 90% of its workforce had to 
be located in Catalonia. As such, many big firms operating in the whole of the state were 
excluded and so there is an unavoidable sample selection bias in favor of small firms 
(affecting especially the building industry, see discussion below). However, this bias does 
not affect the main conclusions offered by our study. The sample selection was also subject 
to the availability of financial data in the SABI database.  
All firms reporting fatal and serious accidents during the period, and complying 
with the aforementioned criteria, were included in the sample. Firms reporting minor 
accidents were selected randomly to reach a total of 100 firms for each of the three 
industries. Our final sample included 299 firms (a building sector firm had to be excluded 
as it presented two different activity code numbers) with 1,517 year-data observations and a 
total of 12,189 workers reporting work-place related injuries during the period studied (see 
Table 1). The number of injured workers in each of the three industries is conditioned by 
the average firm size, there being fewer injuries in the building industry (see Table 1) as the 
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firms in this sector tend to be smaller (in terms of number of workers, but also total assets) 
than those in the other two sectors (see Table 2). However, the number of fatalities was 
higher in this industry as was the overall accident rate (see Table 2).  
 
(Insert Table 1 about here) 
 
Significant differences were recorded in the size, profitability, efficiency and 
accident rates of the three industries (see Table 2), which justifies our decision to include 
dummy variables in our models controlling for industry characteristics. However, no 
significant differences were found in the relative change of efficiency. We use the dummy 
variables BUILDING and METAL indicating, with a value of 1, that a firm belongs to the 
building and metallurgical manufacturing (except machinery) industries respectively, and 0 
otherwise. The default variable, therefore, is the retail & household repairs industry. The 
firms in this last sector tend to be less profitable, but report a higher turnover, than those in 
the other two industries in the sample. The Spanish real estate sector flourished during the 
period of study giving abnormal returns for firms in the building industry. By contrast, the 
lower abnormal returns, as well as the lower returns on assets, recorded by the retail & 
household repair firms in our sample reflect the growing competitive pressure in this sector.  
 
(Insert Table 2 about here) 
 
As the Pearson correlations between the independent variables included in the 
models were low (see Table 3), collinearity is unlikely to affect our estimations. The 
highest coefficient (-0.5223) is between the dummy variables indicating sector 
characteristics. A significant negative correlation was found between firm size and accident 
rate, suggesting that bigger firms adopt more preventive measures than their smaller 
counterparts. The correlation between the relative change in asset turnover and profitability 
was significant, but very small (0.0452). A possible explanation is that the first of these 
variables refers to the variation in just one year, while the second contains a wider span of 
accumulated information on the firm’s past management decisions. Our subsequent 
multivariate analysis revealed that when controlling for previous profitability, relative 
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changes in efficiency had a significant influence on current profitability. This correlation 
was higher when we considered variables expressing relative changes in both: efficiency 
and profitability (a significant Pearson correlation of 0.1879). Note, however, that these 
data are not shown in Table 3, because the variable change in return on assets is not 
included in our equations. 
 
(Insert Table 3 about here) 
 
 
3. Results 
 
Table 4 displays descriptive statistics concerning accident rates for different 
percentiles of ROA and ABNROA. Overall, this first approach suggests the existence of a 
negative relationship between labor accidents and financial performance. Despite it is not 
perfectly linear, firms with the lowest financial performance present higher labor accidents 
with respect to those with the highest financial performance, for the building and retail and 
household repairs industries. The relationship is stronger for accident rates in previous year. 
On the contrary, the relationship is slightly positive for the metallurgical industry, but 
differences are just (and scarcely) significant for accidents in previous year between firms 
above and below abnormal return on assets (see panel D). Mean values offer similar results 
(not displayed). These results provide a preliminary support for our Hypotheses 1 and 2, 
but also suggest different behaviors across industries, which are also reflected in Pearson 
correlations: ranging from -0.1311 (significant with p<0.01) to 0.0297 (non significant with 
p<0.1) between accident rate in previous year and ROA for the building and metallurgical 
industries respectively. 
 
(Insert Table 4 about here) 
 
Table 5 shows our estimations for Eq. (1), in which the accident rate and the 
dependent variable refer to the same year. As the value of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-
Weisberg test (26.42) indicates the existence of heteroskedasticity (p<0.05), the table (as 
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well as Tables 6-8) includes estimates of robustness. Given that our sample presents the 
typical autocorrelation pattern for panel data, we performed panel data estimations. The 
commonly used Hausman test (Hsiao 2005) rejects the null hypothesis of no correlation 
between the individual effects and the explanatory variables. As the individual effects are 
correlated with the regressors, the fixed effects estimator is more consistent and efficient 
than that of random effects. The value of the Hausman test (582.49) is significant at p<0.05 
(with three degrees of freedom). Fixed effects estimators are included in column B of Table 
4. As the firms in the sample operate in the same industry across all periods, with fixed 
effects, collinearity affects estimations and the corresponding dummy variables are omitted.  
 
(Insert Table 5 about here) 
 
Given that there are significant differences between all three industries in almost all 
their variables (see Table 2), our results are not reliable when control variables for industry 
characteristics are not included in the model. Consequently, we focus on the random effects 
estimations, controlling for these dummy variables, and thus reinforce our results with the 
additional estimations shown in Table 5. The estimated coefficients for variables in Eq. (1) 
for analyzing the incidence of accident rate, in a given year, on the financial performance in 
the same year are (see data displayed in column A in Table 5): 
 
, = 2.556386 − 0.0207392 ∙ , + 0.5089918 ∙ , + 3.658144
∙ , + 1.879864 ∙ "5%,56 + 0.9797245
∙ 7%																																																																																																			(5) 
 
Random effects estimations (column A) fit cross-sectional time-series data 
producing a matrix-weighted average of the between and within results. Newey-West 
estimations (column C) assume the error structure to be heteroskedastic and possibly 
autocorrelated up to the lagged data. Generalized estimating equations (GEE - column D) 
fit population-averaged panel-data models. All estimations present a significant goodness-
of-fit. These three estimations (columns A, C and D) provide similar and expected results 
with respect to the control variables: profitability of previous year and the increase in asset 
15 
 
turnover, while operating in the building sector significantly influences higher current 
profitability. Previous management characteristics and changes in management decisions 
influence a firm’s profitability. Thus, the coefficients of ROA, CHASSETURN and 
BUILDING are positive and significant at p<0.05 for all three estimations. Random effects 
estimations when controlling for the dummy variable of year characteristics also reinforce 
these results (column E). If we focus on our variable of interest, the ACRATE coefficient is 
found to be persistently negative, albeit not significant at p<0.1 in all four estimations 
(columns A, C, D and E). The variable is also not significant in the fixed effects estimation 
(column B). As such, all the results in Table 5 fail to support Hypothesis 1 when the 
incidence of the labor accident rate on profitability is analyzed in the same year. 
Table 6 shows robust estimations when the dependent variable is the one-year-
ahead profitability with respect to the accident rate. The estimated coefficients for variables 
in Eq. (1) for analyzing the incidence of accident rate, in a given year, on the financial 
performance in the following year are (see data displayed in column A in Table 6): 
 
,8 = 2.673717 − 0.0335494 ∙ , + 0.5078374 ∙ , + 3.591106
∙ ,8 + 1.937567 ∙ "5%,56 + 1.022341
∙ 7%																																																																																																				(6) 
 
All the estimations in Table 6 present a significant goodness-of-fit, while the 
coefficient of the accident rate is not significant at p<0.1 for the fixed effects estimations 
(column B). However, in all the estimations controlling for industry characteristics 
(columns A, C, D and E), in line with the results in Table 5, we report significant 
coefficients for the control variables. Likewise, the coefficients for ACRATE are negative 
and significant at p<0.05, which supports both Hypotheses 1 and 2. Thus while our results 
indicate a negative incidence of accidents in the workplace on firm profitability, the actual 
incidence is recorded in the long term. According to our results, an accident rate of 1% 
entails a 0.03% fall in a firm’s return on assets in the following year where the mean and 
median return on assets for firms in our sample are 7.4 and 6.5%, respectively (see Table 
2). 
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(Insert Table 6 about here) 
 
Table 7 shows robust estimations for the incidence of labor accidents on abnormal 
profitability in the same year. Here, we also focus on random effects, Newey and GEE 
estimations (columns A, C, D and E), and the control variables present the expected 
significant sign in most instances. The building industry presents a higher abnormal 
profitability than that of the default sector, reflecting the effects of the property boom 
during the period studied. The dummy variable for the metallurgical sector also presents a 
significant positive sign. Size, as expected, is inversely related to abnormal returns on 
assets. No estimation presents a significant sign for our variable of interest with p<0.05, a 
finding that is in accordance with the results in Table 5 (incidence of accident rate on 
profitability in the same year). In Newey-West estimations (column C) this variable is 
negative and significant with p<0.1. The estimated coefficients for variables in Eq. (2) for 
analyzing the incidence of accident rate, in a given year, on the abnormal financial 
performance in the same year are (see data displayed in column A in Table 7): 
 
", = 5.569013 − 0.0110401 ∙ , − 0.6936211 ∙ %,
+ 2.574576 ∙ "5%,56 + 2.362443 ∙ 7%																											(7) 
 
(Insert Table 7 about here) 
 
Table 8 shows estimations when the dependent variable is the one-year-ahead 
abnormal profitability. All estimations present a significant goodness of fit at p<0.05. In the 
fixed effects estimation the coefficient of our variable of interest is not significant at p<0.1 
(column B). However, as the Hausman test (3.82) is not significant at p<0.1 with two 
degrees of freedom, it did not reject the null hypothesis of no correlation between 
individual effects and the explanatory variable. Individual effects are uncorrelated with the 
regressors and the random effects estimator is consistent and efficient. As discussed, an 
additional advantage of the random effects estimation with respect to that of fixed effects is 
that it allows control variables for sector characteristics to be included in the model. The 
results of the random effects estimation, reinforced with the results of the Newey-West and 
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GEE estimations, show the expected significant coefficients for the control variables in 
most of the estimations that control for industry characteristics (columns A, C, D and E). 
These results are in line with those previously discussed in Table 7. The estimated 
coefficients for variables in Eq. (2) for analyzing the incidence of accident rate, in a given 
year, on the abnormal financial performance in the following year are (see data displayed in 
column A in Table 8): 
 
",8 = 6.695355 − 0.0466398 ∙ , − 0.7703725 ∙ %,
+ 2.635565 ∙ "5%,56 + 2.446454 ∙ 7%																											(8) 
 
The rate of accidents in the workplace has a significant impact (at p<0.05) on a 
firm’s one-year-ahead abnormal profitability in the random effects estimation, the Newey-
West estimation, the GEE and the enlarged model with random effects when controlling for 
the dummy variables for years (columns A, C, D and E, respectively, in Table 8). 
According to these results, an accident rate of 1% entails a 0.04% fall in profitability due to 
a firm’s abnormal return on assets in the following year, and they provide further support 
for Hypotheses 1 and 2. 
 
(Insert Table 8 about here) 
 
R-squared values of each estimation displayed in Tables 5 to 8 are low, specifically 
those relating to abnormal profitability (Tables 7 and 8), thus indicating that financial 
performance, and more precisely abnormal return on assets, is affected by multiple factors 
that are difficult to capture with our models. Despite our results must be taken cautiously, 
they are obtained through models usually used in predicting financial performance (referred 
in section 2.2), and are strong across the different estimations performed.  
We repeated the multivariate analysis for each three industry subsamples (data not 
shown). Despite the decrease in sample size, we also find significant negative influence of 
labor accidents in previous year on profitability and abnormal profitability, for the building 
and retail and household repairs industries. However, we find no significant influence with 
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the subsample of the metallurgical sector. Therefore, results cannot be generalized to all 
industries and circumstances, and must be taken cautiously. 
We do not obtain any significant coefficients for our variable of interest when 
conducting estimations with two-year lagged accident rates (data not shown), suggesting 
that the effect of accidents in the workplace does not persist in a firm’s two-year-ahead 
performance or in its abnormal financial performance. The Wald test does not support the 
existence of a significant joint influence (at p<0.05) of the accident rate in a given year and 
the one-year lagged (or two-year lagged) accident rate on a firm’s financial performance. 
As accident rates across periods present highly significant positive correlations, collinearity 
likely distorts estimations when accident rates from various years are jointly introduced as 
independent variables. The loss of observations with increased lags in accident rates is, of 
course, an additional problem. As such, the estimations included in Tables 5 to 8 are more 
appropriate for analyzing the incidence of accident rates on a firm’s financial performance 
than are estimations that include various variables of lagged accident rates. 
We also removed one case with extraordinary labor accident rate. Here, the results for all 
the estimation methods, with and without dummy variables for years (data not shown), 
were very similar to those reported above.  
 
 
4. Discussion and conclusions 
 
In this study we approach safety in the workplace as an outcome of a sound human 
resources policy, with an obvious motivational and performative setting. Work accidents 
disrupt business operations, undermine motivation, interfere with productivity, generate 
unforeseen costs and affect firm performance. Consequently, our first hypothesis postulates 
that accidents in the workplace have a negative influence on firm performance. When a 
labor accident occurs, employees refocus their efforts to deal with the incident, and apply 
urgent measures to ensure that daily operations continue, while strategic tasks are set aside. 
Above all, labor accidents affect value-added activities and strategic planning. Therefore 
our second hypothesis formulates that the true incidence of accidents in the workplace on 
firm performance tends to be in the long rather than in the short-run. 
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Our study provides empirical evidence of the negative influence of accidents in the 
workplace on firm profitability. This impact, however, does not make itself manifest 
immediately. Most estimations relating accident rates with firm performance in the same 
year provide a negative coefficient for this variable, but it is only significant with p<0.1 in 
the Newey estimation for abnormal return on assets. Therefore, with these results we do not 
find full support for our Hypothesis 1 relative to the influence of the accident rate on a 
firm’s immediate performance. Labor accidents disrupt firms’ operations, but managers and 
workers find the way to reinforce their efforts in order to minimize their incidence on 
immediate performance. Their main impact is on a firm’s one-year-ahead profitability. 
Coefficients for accident rates are all negative and significant (with p<0.05) for estimations 
performed for one year ahead return on assets and abnormal return on assets, an controlling 
for sector characteristics. It is one year after an accident that a significant negative 
influence on firm profitability is recorded. Therefore we find support for our Hypothesis 2 
stating that the true incidence of accidents in the workplace on firm performance tends to 
be in the long-term. Our results suggest that labor accidents disrupt mainly strategic and 
value added activities allowing firms to be in advantageous position to attain future 
performance and to build firm capabilities. Our results suggest that managers and workers 
redirect their efforts giving priority to urgent operational tasks when an accident occurs. 
The significant negative coefficients for accident rates provide indeed support for our 
Hypothesis 1. Our results are consistent across different estimation methods and control 
variables, as well as with two industry subsamples. However, they are not confirmed for 
one of the three industry subsamples included in our study. Moreover, the R-squared values 
of the estimated models are low, especially those relating accident rates to abnormal 
returns, and consequently the results and conclusions should be taken cautiously. 
Our results have some interesting practical implications. For example, firms should 
see that it is in their own best interests to implement occupational health safety measures, 
hitherto enforced by legislative means. Hopkins (1999) argues that while it would appear 
entirely rational from an economic perspective to devote a considerable amount of 
resources to minimizing accident risks, organizations often fail to do so, showing an 
inability to act rationally. It is our belief that managers have considerable difficulty in 
quantifying the costs of accidents in the workplace and in calculating the gains to be made 
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from operating a sound safety policy. Thus while they are typically ill-informed about the 
costs that are incurred in accident prevention, they have no understanding of the indirect 
consequences of accidents in the workplace. The British directors interviewed in Smallman 
and John’s (2001) study claimed to be vaguely aware that a poor occupational health safety 
record might lead to a loss of reputation, but felt there was little to be gained from anything 
more than minimum compliance. The maintenance of their reputation was the sole benefit 
they associated with occupational safety. The British directors reported making only rough 
calculations of their health and safety expenditure, and reported that occupational safety 
costs were not listed as a specific item in their accounts. With these current management 
accounting techniques, it was therefore extremely difficult to assess these costs and to 
calculate the return on their investment. Similarly, Harshbarger (2001) claims that 
managers have little appreciation of the economic consequences of unsafe practices in the 
workplace. The subsequent recommendation is that firms devote resources and accurate 
cost accounting techniques for assessing the true economic consequences of labor 
accidents. 
Information on accidents in the workplace contributes to provide a picture of the 
firm’s social responsibility and its implication with occupational health safety. Moreover, 
given that labor accidents have a significant influence on firm financial performance, an 
additional practical implication of this study is that their disclosure provides relevant 
information for stakeholders. With respect to the specific investors’ point of view, accidents 
in the workplace provide useful insights on future firm profitability. However, firms do not 
usually provide information on this issue in most countries, with the exception of specific 
voluntary disclosures, such as for example those included in the Global Reporting Initiative 
guidelines. An obvious recommendation in this respect is that disclosure of accidents in the 
workplace should be mandatory in accounting standards. In this vein, mandatory disclosure 
would elicit that firms loath to avoid labor accidents apply preventive safety measures. 
This study contributes to the literature by providing a performance appraisal of 
accidents in the workplace. All efforts to shed further light on the mechanisms linking 
unsafe behavior in the workplace with its economic consequences for firms are valuable 
and provide guidelines for improving occupational health safety. The awareness among 
senior management that a poor safety performance has an incidence on financial 
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performance should serve to promote health safety. Introducing appropriate economic 
incentives should, therefore, propitiate decisions that strengthen the management of safety 
performance. However, further research is needed to address this specific issue. 
A limitation of this study is that the firms’ financial performance is analyzed only in 
relation to data available from their financial statements. We have not addressed 
externalities and the whole array of indirect costs related to accidents in the workplace. As 
Cordier (2003) and Labelle (2000) stress, there are a whole series of indirect costs 
associated with such accidents that presumably exceed the direct costs recorded in a firm’s 
financial statements and which are difficult to calculate and measure in economic terms. 
While some of these costs extend beyond the firm in which the accident occurs, affecting 
individual workers and society at large, other indirect costs do affect the firm. Our 
empirical study, though, does not identify these costs. However, our results suggest that 
while firms find a way of minimizing their negative influence in the short run, they are 
unable to do so in the long run. Further research is therefore needed on the incidence of 
both the direct and indirect costs of accidents in the workplace. As previously mentioned, 
an additional limitation of this study is that the R-squared values of the estimated models 
are low. More research is also needed for different industries, with wider samples and with 
models able to explain a major portion of variability of the dependent variables. 
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Table 1 
Data Sample 
 
 Building 
Retail & 
household 
repairs 
Metallurgical 
except 
machinery Total 
Number of firms in 1998 82 85 89 256 
Number of firms in 1999 89 84 89 262 
Number of firms in 2000 87 81 83 251 
Number of firms in 2001 88 81 90 259 
Number of firms in 2002 88 75 86 249 
Number of firms in 2003 85 70 85 240 
Total number of year data 
observations 519 476 522 1,517 
Total number of firms 99 100 100 299 
Number of workers with 
minor injuries  1,699 6,287 3,928 11,914 
Number of seriously injured 
workers 87 44 102 233 
Number of fatalities  30 5 7 42 
Total number of injured 
workers 1,816 6,336 4,037 12,189 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics 
 
 Building 
Retail & household 
repairs 
Metallurgical except 
machinery Total  
 mean median mean median mean median mean median  
Number of workers 48.9 29.0 264.6 59.0 84.2 48.5 128.7 44.0 *** 
ACRATE  12.1 8.7 8.8 5.7 11.0 5.3 10.7 6.7 ** 
ROA 8.0 6.5 5.8 5.3 8.2 7.3 7.4 6.5 *** 
ABNROA 1.89 0.48 -3.79 -2.75 1.49 0.44 0.00 -0.22 *** 
Asset turnover 1.5 1.4 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.4 1.8 1.5 *** 
CHASSETURN 0.0384 -0.0178 0.0403 0.0090 -0.0019 -0.0085 0.0250 -0.0058  
Deflated assets 90,705.9 19,856.1 177,406.0 29,514.3 87,380.2 37,882.2 116,802.7 27,696.2 *** 
 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 (Kruskal-Wallis test). 
ACRATE is the percent of workers injured with respect to the firm’s total workforce, ROA is the percent of return on assets, Asset turnover is the 
ratio of revenues to assets, CHASSETURN is the difference between asset turnover in a given year and in the previous year relative to asset 
turnover in the previous year (in per-one basis), and deflated assets is the value of firm’s total assets held at the end of the accounting period (in 
hundred €) deflated with the Spanish consumer price index. 
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Table 3 
Pearson correlations between independent variables 
 
ACRATEt-1 ACRATEt ROAt CHASSETURNt BUILDING METAL LNASSETt-1 
ACRATEt-1 1 
ACRATEt 0.4704*** 1 
ROAt -0.041 0.0002 1 
CHASSETURNt -0.0075 0.0543 0.0452** 1 
BUILDING 0.0643** 0.0799*** 0.0521** 0.0295 1 
METAL 0.0263 0.0169 0.0677*** -0.0595** -0.5223*** 1 
LNASSETt-1 -0.2405*** -0.2518*** -0.1029*** 0.0302 -0.1922*** 0.1274*** 1 
 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
ACRATE is the percent of workers injured with respect to the firm’s total workforce; ROA is the percent of return on assets; CHASSETURN is the 
difference between asset turnover in a given year and in the previous year relative to asset turnover in the previous year (in per-one basis); 
BUILDING and METAL are dummy variables indicating sector characteristics; and LNASSET is the value of firm’s total assets held (in hundred €) 
deflated with the Spanish consumer price index. 
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Table 4 
Median values of labor accidents for different percentiles of return on assets and abnormal return on assets (percent of workers injured 
with respect to the firm’s total workforce) 
 
1st. perc. 2nd. perc. 3rd. perc. 4th. perc. 
4rt. vs. 
1st. 
below 
median 
above 
median 
above vs 
below 
Panel A: Labor accidents for different percentiles of return on assets in the same year 
    Building 11.11111 10 7.692307 5.961265 *** 11.11111 6.896552 *** 
Retail & household repairs 7.594937 5.256571 5.633803 5.063291 ** 6.25 5.274751 
 Metallurgical except machinery 6.122449 5.205108 7.236155 4 
 
5.263158 5.357143 
 Whole sample (all sectors) 8 5.961265 6.896552 5.263158 ** 7.142857 5.961265 
 
         Panel B: Labor accidents for different percentiles of abnormal return on assets in the same year 
  Building 11.11111 8.333333 8.695652 6.024096 * 10.34483 7.692307 * 
Retail & household repairs 8.490566 5.263158 6.077771 5.063291 *** 6.776094 5.263158 
 Metallurgical except machinery 6.266353 3.704974 7.889822 3.125 
 
4.460322 5.555555 
 Whole sample (all sectors) 8.5556 5.926251 7.430263 5.263158 ** 6.451613 7.142857 
 
         Panel C: Labor accidents in previous year for different percentiles of return on assets 
    Building 11.11111 10.86957 8.391608 3.722677 *** 11.11111 6.594203 *** 
Retail & household repairs 9.245014 4.761905 6.603812 4.819977 *** 6.802118 4.944128 
 Metallurgical except machinery 2.812795 4.290876 7.377345 5.882353 
 
3.145358 6.818182 
 Whole sample (all sectors) 8.054054 6.25 7.54717 4.819977 *** 7.23169 6.060606 
 
         Panel D: Labor accidents in previous year for different percentiles of abnormal return on assets 
  Building 10.52632 11.11111 7.692307 4.166667 ** 11.11111 6.594203 *** 
Retail & household repairs 9.160839 4.819977 4.737516 4.918363 *** 7.124728 4.903813 * 
Metallurgical except machinery 2.439024 2.380952 8.064516 4 
 
2.424332 6.634897 * 
Whole sample (all sectors) 7.750586 6.557377 6.896552 4.573171 ** 7.23169 5.882353 
 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 (with t-tests, and Mann-Witney when there are significant differences in variances). 
Financial performance ranked from low (1st percentile) to high (4th percentile). 
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Table 5 
Incidence of labor accident rate and control variables on return on assets (ROAt) in the same year. Parameter estimates with panel 
robust estimations. 
 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  
Variables Random effects  Fixed effects  Newey  GEE 
 
Random effects  
ACRATEt -0.0207392  0.0121013  -0.0207392  -0.0215746  -0.0215249  
ROAt-1 0.5089918 *** -0.0048074  0.5089918 *** 0.6202891 *** 0.5092561 *** 
CHASSETURNt 3.658144 ** 2.276225 * 3.658144 *** 4.066752 *** 3.518995 ** 
BUILDING 1.879864 *** (omitted)  1.879864 *** 1.695971 *** 1.907885 *** 
METAL 0.9797245  (omitted)  0.9797245 * 0.666774  0.9959573  
YEAR2000         -1.309454 ** 
YEAR2001         -2.545163 *** 
YEAR2002         -0.9572519  
YEAR2003         -1.976846 *** 
intercept 2.556386 *** 7.13543 *** 2.556386 *** 1.898082 *** 3.913355 *** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Goodness-of-fit Wald chi2(5) =  129.25 *** 
F(3, 291) = 
2.21 * 
F(5, 1211) = 
14.34 *** 
Wald chi2(5) = 
221.91 *** 
Wald chi2(9) = 
282.00 *** 
R-squared overall 0.2666  0.0002      0.2758  
Nº of observations 1,217.00   1,217.00   1,217.00   1,217.00   1,217.00  
 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
ACRATE is the percent of workers injured with respect to the firm’s total workforce; ROA is the percent of return on assets; CHASSETURN is the 
difference between asset turnover in a given year and in the previous year relative to asset turnover in the previous year (in per-one basis); and 
BUILDING, METAL and YEAR are dummy variables indicating sector and period characteristics.   
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Table 6  
Incidence of labor accident rate and control variables on one-year-ahead return on assets (ROAt+1). Parameter estimates with panel 
robust estimations. 
 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  
Variables Random effects  Fixed effects  Newey  GEE   Random effects  
ACRATEt -0.0335494 ** -0.0313531  -0.0335494 ** -0.0303982 ** -0.0317884 ** 
ROAt 0.5078374 *** -0.004587  0.5078374 *** 0.6145785 *** 0.5081587 *** 
CHASSETURNt+1 3.591106 ** 2.224848 * 3.591106 *** 3.987944 ** 3.555817 ** 
BUILDING 1.937567 *** (omitted)  1.937567 *** 1.748679 *** 1.973148 *** 
METAL 1.022341  (omitted)  1.022341 * 0.7118476 ** 1.034836 * 
YEAR1998         1.79731 *** 
YEAR1999         0.5710026 * 
YEAR2000         -0.5795109  
YEAR2001         0.9311647  
intercept 2.673717 *** 7.599461 *** 2.673717 *** 2.006379 *** 2.072614 *** 
           
Goodness-of-fit Wald chi2(5) = 141.64 *** 
F(3, 291) = 
3.22 ** 
F(5, 1211) = 
15.39 *** 
Wald chi2(5) 
=  230.47 *** 
Wald chi2(9) 
= 286.00 *** 
R-squared overall 0.2681  0.0012      0.2761  
Nº of observations 1,217   1,217   1,217   1,217   1,217  
 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
ACRATE is the percent of workers injured with respect to the firm’s total workforce; ROA is the percent of return on assets; CHASSETURN is the 
difference between asset turnover in a given year and in the previous year relative to asset turnover in the previous year (in per-one basis); and 
BUILDING, METAL and YEAR are dummy variables indicating sector and period characteristics.  
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Table 7 
Incidence of labor accident rate and control variables on abnormal return on assets (ABNROAt) in the same year. Parameter estimates 
with panel robust estimations. 
 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  
Variables Random effects  Fixed effects  Newey  GEE   Random effects  
ACRATEt -0.0110401  0.0110977  -0.0357456 * -0.0133773  -0.0107947  
LNASSETt-1 -0.6936211 * -2.706554 ** -0.7433602 ** -0.6856209 * -0.5499598  
BUILDING 2.574576 ** (omitted)  2.896722 *** 2.609434 *** 2.717718 *** 
METAL 2.362443 ** (omitted)  2.745982 *** 2.399271 ** 2.40015 ** 
YEAR2000         -0.8494519 ** 
YEAR2001         -2.537807 *** 
YEAR2002         -1.741311 *** 
YEAR2003         -2.488507 *** 
intercept 5.569013  27.98508 ** 6.183117 ** 5.493406  5.50634  
         
  
Goodness-of-fit Wald chi2(4) = 8.18 * 
F(2, 286) = 
2.93 * 
F(4, 1154) = 
5.38 *** 
Wald chi2(4) 
= 8.28 * 
Wald chi2(8) = 
20.81 *** 
R-squared overall 0.0311  0.0108      0.0398  
Nº of observations 1,159   1,159   1,159   1,159   1,159  
 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
ACRATE is the percent of workers injured with respect to the firm’s total workforce; ROA is the percent of return on assets; LNASSET is the value 
of firm’s total assets held (in hundred €) deflated with the Spanish consumer price index; and BUILDING, METAL and YEAR are dummy variables 
indicating sector and period characteristics.  
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Table 8 
Incidence of labor accident rate and control variables on one-year-ahead abnormal return on assets (ABNROAt+1). Parameter estimates 
with panel robust estimations. 
 
 (A)  (B)  (C)  (D)  (E)  
Variables Random effects  Fixed effects  Newey  GEE  
Random 
effects 
 
ACRATEt -0.0466398 ** -0.0355514  -0.0503127 ** -0.0471421 ** -0.0414286 ** 
LNASSETt -0.7703725 ** -2.645581 ** -0.7748796 *** -0.7599283 ** -0.620007  
BUILDING 2.635565 *** (omitted)  2.93372 *** 2.66648 *** 2.766009 *** 
METAL 2.446454 ** (omitted)  2.785925 *** 2.478388 ** 2.470446 ** 
YEAR2000         -0.8555706 * 
YEAR2001         -2.504343 *** 
YEAR2002         -1.714359 *** 
YEAR2003         -2.422581 *** 
intercept 6.695355 * 27.8451 ** 6.641055 ** 6.577671 * 6.495853 * 
         
  
Goodness-of-fit Wald chi2(4) = 11.34 ** 
F(2,286) = 
3.03 ** 
F(4, 1154) = 
5.89 *** 
Wald chi2(4) 
= 11.57 ** 
Wald chi2(8) 
= 22.17 *** 
R-squared overall 0.0345  0.0125      0.0426  
Nº of observations 1,159   1,159   1,159   1,159   1,159  
 
Significance levels: * p<0.1, ** p<0.05 and *** p<0.01 
ACRATE is the percent of workers injured with respect to the firm’s total workforce; ROA is the percent of return on assets; LNASSET is the value 
of firm’s total assets held (in hundred €) deflated with the Spanish consumer price index; and BUILDING, METAL and YEAR are dummy variables 
indicating sector and period characteristics. 
